more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 14492

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object ]

Full Idea

The constitution theorists, who claim that the sweater and the thread are different things, should offer some explanation of why we tend to say that there is just one thing there. They must simply claim that we 'do not count by identity'.

Gist of Idea

If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?

Source

Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 5.8)

Book Ref

Hawley,Katherine: 'How Things Persist' [OUP 2004], p.163

A Reaction

Her example is a sweater knitted from a single piece of thread. Presumably we could count by sortal identity, so there is one thread here, and there is one sweater here. We just can't add the two together. No ontological arithmetic.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [objects should be understood as what they are made of]:

16066 Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus]
6019 If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
16076 Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
16081 The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
16082 Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
16228 The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
16229 Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
14492 If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
12867 A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
13279 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]