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Single Idea 14493
[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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Full Idea
A higher standard for saying that entities exist might require that they play an essential role in explanation, or must figure in any complete causal story, or exist according to some uniform and nonarbitrary principle of composition.
Gist of Idea
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way
Source
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 11.2)
Book Ref
Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.193
A Reaction
I am struck by the first of these three. If I am defending the notion that essence depends on Aristotle's account of explanation, then if we add that existence also depends on explanation, we get a criterion for the existence of essences. Yay.
The
21 ideas
from 'Ordinary Objects'
21651
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It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair
[Thomasson, by Hofweber]
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14467
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Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought
[Thomasson]
|
14466
|
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview
[Thomasson]
|
14471
|
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules
[Thomasson]
|
14475
|
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims?
[Thomasson]
|
14474
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Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to
[Thomasson]
|
14476
|
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified
[Thomasson]
|
14477
|
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category
[Thomasson]
|
14478
|
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic
[Thomasson]
|
14479
|
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
[Thomasson]
|
14480
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Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world
[Thomasson]
|
14481
|
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile
[Thomasson]
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14482
|
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses
[Thomasson]
|
14483
|
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties?
[Thomasson]
|
14485
|
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
[Thomasson]
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14487
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The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
[Thomasson]
|
14486
|
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'
[Thomasson]
|
14489
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Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts
[Thomasson]
|
14488
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Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building'
[Thomasson]
|
14491
|
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
[Thomasson]
|
14493
|
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way
[Thomasson]
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