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Single Idea 14494

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism ]

Full Idea

Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.

Gist of Idea

Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished

Source

Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Supervenience and Mind' [CUP 1993], p.348


A Reaction

Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [mind as by-product of matter, having no effect]:

T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey]
Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley]
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor]
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]