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Single Idea 14495

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification ]

Full Idea

My project is to put the notion of structure or form squarely back at the center of any adequate account of the notion of part, whole and object.

Gist of Idea

I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object

Source

Kathrin Koslicki (The Structure of Objects [2008], Intro)

Book Ref

Koslicki,Kathrin: 'The Structure of Objects' [OUP 2008], p.5


A Reaction

Excellent. It is the fault of logicians, who presumably can't cope with such elusive and complex concepts, that we have ended up with objects as lists of things or properties, or quantifications over them.


The 22 ideas from 'The Structure of Objects'

The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]