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Single Idea 14529

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity ]

Full Idea

Blackburn asks of what theorists propose as underlying the necessity of a proposition, the question whether they themselves are conceived as obtaining of necessity or merely contingently.

Gist of Idea

If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent?

Source

report of Simon Blackburn (Morals and Modals [1987], p.120-1) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 1

Book Ref

'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.6


A Reaction

I've seen a reply to this somewhere: I think the thought was that a necessity wouldn't be any less necessary if it had a contingent source, any more than the father of a world champion boxer has to be a world champion boxer.

Related Idea

Idea 15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]


The 10 ideas from Simon Blackburn

If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]