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Single Idea 14543

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity ]

Full Idea

Whenever the potential active and the potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious to the potentiality, the former must of necessity act and the latter must of necessity be affected.

Gist of Idea

When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a08)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.264

A Reaction

Of course the world could end between the two happenings, so this can't be full-scale metaphysical necessity. That point is not enough, though, to get rid of Aristotle's intuition here.

The 31 ideas with the same theme [causation as necessitated by nature]:

14543 When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
1859 Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
17235 A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes]
4815 From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
12726 In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
2594 A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect [Malebranche]
12702 Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz]
2117 The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
15249 Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
8339 Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
2218 In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
20705 That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume]
19274 Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume]
23667 Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
5523 Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant]
14545 A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
15251 The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer]
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
5445 Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
5463 Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
5491 A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
3290 Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel]
4306 For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
8444 Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]
8445 The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
4212 Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
9443 It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
14539 Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14550 We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14546 Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
22624 A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]