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Full Idea
To speak of 'the' causal explanation privileges some causal powers, but it is implausible that this has a special metaphysical status. Instead, that status should be understood in epistemic or pragmatic terms.
Gist of Idea
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one
Source
S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.2)
Book Ref
Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.132
A Reaction
I suppose so, but I see a distinction between actions of powers which only explain that one event (striking the match), and actions of powers which explain a whole family of surrounding events (presence of oxygen).