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Single Idea 14567

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

To speak of 'the' causal explanation privileges some causal powers, but it is implausible that this has a special metaphysical status. Instead, that status should be understood in epistemic or pragmatic terms.

Gist of Idea

Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one

Source

S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.2)

Book Ref

Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.132


A Reaction

I suppose so, but I see a distinction between actions of powers which only explain that one event (striking the match), and actions of powers which explain a whole family of surrounding events (presence of oxygen).


The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]