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Single Idea 14568
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
]
Full Idea
Knowing the structure that something has does not in itself causally explain that thing's behaviour unless we also know what sorts of behaviour a thing of that structure can cause.
Gist of Idea
A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure
Source
S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.2)
Book Ref
Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.133
A Reaction
I agree with this. If you focus on the lowest possible levels of causal explanation, I can see only powers. Whatever you come up with, it had better be something active. Geometry never started any bonfires.
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[explanation by revealing underlying mechanisms]:
16560
|
Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes
[Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
15960
|
Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us
[Boyle]
|
18716
|
A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement
[Wittgenstein]
|
16557
|
Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities
[Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
13045
|
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
13062
|
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs?
[Salmon]
|
13063
|
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts
[Salmon]
|
17093
|
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
17492
|
Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems
[Glennan on Salmon]
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13601
|
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures
[Ellis]
|
15885
|
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism
[Harré]
|
15254
|
If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour
[Harré/Madden]
|
15317
|
Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real
[Harré/Madden]
|
16842
|
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated
[Lipton]
|
16528
|
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
16529
|
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
16530
|
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
16553
|
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
16559
|
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
17493
|
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams
[Glennan]
|
17487
|
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition
[Glennan]
|
17489
|
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities
[Glennan]
|
17490
|
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals
[Glennan]
|
17491
|
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions
[Glennan]
|
17500
|
General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms
[Portides]
|
12787
|
Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities
[Leuridan]
|
14384
|
We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms
[Leuridan]
|
14386
|
Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities
[Leuridan]
|
14388
|
Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities
[Leuridan]
|
14568
|
A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
17471
|
Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry
[Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
|
17472
|
Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps
[Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
|