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Single Idea 14587

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive ]

Full Idea

We accept primitivism about causation, for how could there be something even more basic in the world than causation, which might allow us to bring forth a reductive analysis?

Gist of Idea

We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced

Source

S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], Concl)

Book Ref

Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.237


A Reaction

I think I agree with this view, and for the same reason. I can't imagine how one could cite any 'categorical' or 'structural' properties, or anything else, without invoking causal phenomena in their characterisation.


The 5 ideas with the same theme [causation is an unanalysable basis of nature]:

The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum]