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Full Idea
We accept primitivism about causation, for how could there be something even more basic in the world than causation, which might allow us to bring forth a reductive analysis?
Gist of Idea
We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced
Source
S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], Concl)
Book Ref
Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.237
A Reaction
I think I agree with this view, and for the same reason. I can't imagine how one could cite any 'categorical' or 'structural' properties, or anything else, without invoking causal phenomena in their characterisation.