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Single Idea 14591

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism ]

Full Idea

Self-proclaimed four-dimensionalists typically adopt a picture that reckons instantaneous objects (and facts about them) to be more fundamental than long-lived ones.

Gist of Idea

Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones

Source

John Hawthorne (Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism [2008], 2.2)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics', ed/tr. Sider/Hawthorne/Zimmerman [Blackwell 2008], p.273

A Reaction

A nice elucidation. As in Idea 14588, this seems motivated by a desire for some sort of foundationalism or atomism. Why shouldn't a metaphysic treat the middle-sized or temporally extended as foundational, and derive the rest that way?

Related Idea

Idea 14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]

The 17 ideas from John Hawthorne

14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
14589 A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
14590 If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
14591 Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
15123 Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
15122 Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
15124 If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
15126 Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
15127 A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
15128 We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
15125 We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]