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Full Idea
On one view, a semantics for a given language is taken to be an assignment of semantic values to its expressions; according to the other, a semantics is taken to be a theory of truth for that language.
Gist of Idea
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth
Source
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], Intro)
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.65
A Reaction
The first is Frege, the second Tarski via Davidson, says Fine. Fine argues against these as the correct alternatives, and says the distinction prevents us understanding what is really going on. He votes for semantics as giving 'semantic requirements'.
Related Idea
Idea 14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |