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Single Idea 14619
[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
]
Full Idea
The source of the Quinean scepticism about analytic and synthetic is, first, scepticism over whether we can factor truth into a semantic and a factual component, and (second) if we can, is the factual component ever null?
Gist of Idea
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part?
Source
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 1)
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.67
A Reaction
You certainly can't grasp 'bachelors are unmarried men' if you haven't grasped the full Woosterian truth about men and marriage. But I could interdefine four meaningless words, so that you could employ them in analytic sentences.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:
20959
|
Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject
[Schleiermacher]
|
21763
|
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge
[Hegel, by Houlgate]
|
2515
|
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way
[Katz on Frege]
|
19050
|
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences
[Quine]
|
8900
|
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity
[Quine]
|
21338
|
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage
[Quine]
|
9366
|
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori
[Quine, by Boghossian]
|
14473
|
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution
[Quine, by Thomasson]
|
7321
|
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best
[Miller,A on Quine]
|
8803
|
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language
[Davidson on Quine]
|
17737
|
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation
[Quine, by Jenkins]
|
1622
|
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
[Quine]
|
1624
|
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
[Quine]
|
8201
|
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction
[Quine]
|
20299
|
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?
[Rey]
|
14619
|
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part?
[Fine,K]
|
15016
|
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention
[Sider]
|