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Full Idea
What distinguishes the referential position in semantics from Fregeanism is that it makes use of de re semantic facts, in which it is required of an object itself that it enter into certain semantic requirements.
Gist of Idea
Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements
Source
Kit Fine (Semantic Necessity [2010], 5)
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.80
A Reaction
I have a repugnance to any sort of semantics that involves the objects themselves, even when dealing with proper names. If I talk of 'Napoleon', no small Frenchman is to be found anywhere in my sentences.
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
| 9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
| 9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
| 14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |