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Full Idea
Salmon argues that S4 and therefore S5 are invalid for metaphysical modality.
Gist of Idea
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality
Source
report of Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 238-40) by Timothy Williamson - Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic 4
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.92
A Reaction
[He gives references for Salmon, and for his own reply] Salmon's view seems to be opposed my most modern logicians (such as Ian Rumfitt).
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |