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Full Idea
On the possible world's account, x's being essentially F is nothing more nor less than x's being F in every world in which it appears.
Gist of Idea
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears
Source
Frank Jackson (Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori [2010], 6)
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.261
A Reaction
There you go - 'true in every possible world' is the definition of metaphysical necessity, not the definition of essence. Either get back to Aristotle, or stop (forever!) talking about 'essence'!
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |