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Full Idea
An object has a property essentially just in case it couldn't conceivably have lacked that property.
Gist of Idea
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it
Source
Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.35)
Book Ref
Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.35
A Reaction
Making it depend on what we can conceive seems a bit dubious, for someone committed to real essences. The key issue is how narrowly or broadly you interpret the word 'property'. The word 'object' needs a bit of thought, too!
| 14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
| 14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
| 14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
| 14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
| 14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
| 14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
| 14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
| 14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |