more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
If anything is essential to Socrates, surely self-identity is.
Gist of Idea
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates?
Source
Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.37)
Book Ref
Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.37
A Reaction
This is the modern move of Plantinga and Adams, to make 'is identical with Socrates' the one property which assures the identity of Socrates (his 'haecceity'). My view is that self-identity is not a property. Plantinga wonders about that on p.44.
| 14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
| 14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
| 14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
| 14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
| 14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
| 14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
| 14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
| 14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |