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Single Idea 14661
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
]
Full Idea
E is an essence if and only if (a) 'has E essentially' is instantiated in some world or other, and (b) for any world W and property P, E entails 'has P in W' or 'does not have P in W'.
Gist of Idea
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties
Source
Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], IV)
Book Ref
Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.69
A Reaction
'Entail' strikes me as a very odd word when you are talking about the structure of the physical world (or are we??). Why would a unique self-identity (his candidate for essence) do the necessary entailing?
The
44 ideas
from Alvin Plantinga
16472
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Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia
[Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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16469
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Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions
[Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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16470
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Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy
[Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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14662
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Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc.
[Plantinga]
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14663
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Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one
[Plantinga]
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14664
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Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds
[Plantinga]
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14666
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Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified
[Plantinga]
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13132
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A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself
[Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
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14642
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Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re'
[Plantinga]
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14643
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'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true
[Plantinga]
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14646
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An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it
[Plantinga]
|
14647
|
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates?
[Plantinga]
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14648
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Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'?
[Plantinga]
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14649
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Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition?
[Plantinga]
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14650
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Maybe proper names involve essentialism
[Plantinga]
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14651
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What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different?
[Plantinga]
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1475
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It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan
[Plantinga, by PG]
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1474
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Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary)
[Plantinga, by PG]
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18383
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Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions
[Plantinga, by Armstrong]
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11891
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Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world
[Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
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20704
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A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds
[Plantinga, by Davies,B]
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9084
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Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true
[Plantinga]
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9085
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If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths
[Plantinga]
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9086
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The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction
[Plantinga]
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9087
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Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts
[Plantinga]
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11982
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If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different
[Plantinga]
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11983
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It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos
[Plantinga]
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11980
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A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs
[Plantinga]
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11984
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Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
[Plantinga]
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11985
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If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties
[Plantinga]
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11986
|
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
[Plantinga]
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11987
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Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently
[Plantinga]
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6356
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Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function'
[Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
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16435
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Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things
[Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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14652
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'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent
[Plantinga]
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14653
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X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere)
[Plantinga]
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14654
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Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world
[Plantinga]
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14655
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The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts
[Plantinga]
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14658
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'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties
[Plantinga]
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14656
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Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them?
[Plantinga]
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14657
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Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it
[Plantinga]
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14660
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If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property?
[Plantinga]
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14659
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We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies
[Plantinga]
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14661
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Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties
[Plantinga]
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