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Single Idea 14683

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds ]

Full Idea

On my conception, the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility are not defined or analyzed in terms of the apparatus of possible worlds. The order of analysis is just the reverse: possible worlds rely on the notion of what might have been.

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality

Source

Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV)

Book Ref

Salmon,Nathan: 'Metaphysics, Mathematics and Meaning' [OUP 2005], p.139

A Reaction

This view seems to be becoming the new orthodoxy, and I certainly agree with it. I have no idea how you can begin to talk about possible worlds if you don't already have some idea of what 'possible' means.

The 29 ideas with the same theme [there is no such thing as a 'possible world']:

13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
18388 Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
6988 Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
13389 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
13390 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
9220 Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
18496 If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
8320 Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12234 Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
19299 Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
12464 If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
12469 Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18821 Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
22636 Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
22638 Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]
23710 Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]