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Single Idea 14696

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics ]

Full Idea

The simplest semantic frameworks assign extensions as semantic values of particular expressions. The extension of a name is the thing, of 'cool' is the set of cool things, and sets of ordered pairs for 2-place predicates. The sentence has T or F.

Gist of Idea

Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates

Source

Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.3

A Reaction

The immediate well-known problem is different predicates with the same extensions, such as 'renate' and 'cordate'. Possible worlds semantics is supposed to be an improvement to cover this, and to give a semantics for modal talk as well. Sounds good.

The 19 ideas from 'Two-Dimensional Semantics'

14695 Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
14696 Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
14697 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
14698 Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
14699 Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
14701 Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
14702 If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
14703 Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
14705 Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
14704 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
14706 Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
14711 Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
14709 Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
14715 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
14714 Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
14716 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
14717 Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
14719 In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
14720 Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]