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Single Idea 14701

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics ]

Full Idea

In a two-dimensional matrix we array possible circumstances of evaluation (worlds) along the horizontal axis, and possible contexts of utterance (world, person, time) along the vertical axis.

Gist of Idea

Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical

Source

Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.1.2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.5


A Reaction

This is due to Stalnaker 1978, and is clearest in operation when applied to an indexical such as 'I' in 'I am President'. 'I' is a rigid designator, but depends on context. The grid is filled in with T or F for each utterance in each world.


The 19 ideas from 'Two-Dimensional Semantics'

Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]