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Single Idea 14702

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics ]

Full Idea

At first glance necessity and possibility can be fully expressed by quantifying over all possible worlds, but this cannot capture 'Possibly everything actually red is also shiny'. This needs a double-indexed framework, with worlds playing two roles.

Gist of Idea

If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this

Source

Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.2.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.9

A Reaction

She points out that this also applies to tense logic, for the notion of 'now'. The point is that we not only need a set of possible worlds, but we also need a procedure (the 'Actuality' operator A or @) for picking out one of the worlds as special.

The 19 ideas from 'Two-Dimensional Semantics'

14695 Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
14696 Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
14697 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
14698 Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
14699 Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
14701 Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
14702 If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
14703 Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
14705 Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
14704 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
14706 Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
14711 Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
14709 Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
14715 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
14714 Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
14716 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
14717 Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
14719 In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
14720 Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]