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Single Idea 14703
[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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Full Idea
If we have a 'fixedly' operator F, then a sentence is fixedly actually true if it is true no matter which world is designated as actual (which 'he actually won in 2008' fails to be). Maybe '□' is superficial necessity, and FA is 'deep' necessity.
Clarification
FA reads as 'Fixedly Actually'
Gist of Idea
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
Source
Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 1.2.2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.11
A Reaction
Gareth Evans distinguishes 'deep' from 'superficial' necessity. Humberstone and others introduced 'F'. Presumably FA is deeper because it has to pass a tougher test.
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[different ways in which things must be]:
1690
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A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity
[Aristotle]
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21389
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Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events
[Long on Carneades]
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21362
|
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral
[Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
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9442
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The only necessity is logical necessity
[Wittgenstein]
|
13576
|
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
[Ellis]
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6987
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We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
[Jackson]
|
15291
|
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given)
[Harré/Madden]
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16466
|
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
[Stalnaker]
|
14680
|
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility
[Salmon,N]
|
9205
|
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative
[Fine,K]
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15079
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'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
[Lowe]
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16533
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Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities
[Lowe]
|
8261
|
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute
[Hale]
|
15081
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A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way
[Hale]
|
15080
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'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true)
[Hale]
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13721
|
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist
[Sider]
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19286
|
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p
[Hale]
|
19288
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Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities
[Hale]
|
19290
|
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary
[Hale]
|
7800
|
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary
[Girle]
|
4646
|
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
[Baggini /Fosl]
|
9482
|
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
[Bird]
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13244
|
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations)
[Beall/Restall]
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10933
|
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
[Rami]
|
14703
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Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
[Schroeter]
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14532
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A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence
[Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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