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Single Idea 14705
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
]
Full Idea
Perhaps our best way of understanding names and natural kind terms is that we have apriori access to currently associated reference-fixing criterion, but only a posteriori access to the associated modal profile.
Gist of Idea
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori?
Source
Laura Schroeter (Two-Dimensional Semantics [2010], 2.1)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.13
A Reaction
This is the 'generalized' view of 2D semantics (covering everything, not just modals and indexicals). I know apriori what something is, but only study will reveal its possibilities. The actual world is easy to talk about, but possible worlds are harder.
The
19 ideas
from 'Two-Dimensional Semantics'
14695
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Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts
[Schroeter]
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14696
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Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates
[Schroeter]
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14697
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'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension
[Schroeter]
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14698
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Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world
[Schroeter]
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14699
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Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings
[Schroeter]
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14701
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Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical
[Schroeter]
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14702
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If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this
[Schroeter]
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14703
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Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
[Schroeter]
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14705
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Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori?
[Schroeter]
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14704
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2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings
[Schroeter]
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14706
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Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin
[Schroeter]
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14711
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Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state
[Schroeter]
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14709
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Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims
[Schroeter]
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14715
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2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference
[Schroeter]
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14714
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Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent
[Schroeter]
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14716
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2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved
[Schroeter]
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14717
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Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation
[Schroeter]
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14719
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In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True)
[Schroeter]
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14720
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Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works
[Schroeter]
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