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Single Idea 14707
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
]
Full Idea
On the empiricist view of meaning, the relevance of conceptual analysis to metaphysics is that it establishes that a putative reduction respects the original meaning of the target expression.
Gist of Idea
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings
Source
report of Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], p.28) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.2.4
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.19
The
52 ideas
from Frank Jackson
8499
|
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars
[Jackson]
|
8500
|
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned
[Jackson]
|
14288
|
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain
[Jackson, by Edgington]
|
13769
|
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident
[Jackson, by Edgington]
|
14289
|
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent
[Jackson, by Edgington]
|
14353
|
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F
[Jackson]
|
14354
|
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth
[Jackson]
|
14355
|
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T
[Jackson]
|
14352
|
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components
[Jackson]
|
14358
|
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated
[Jackson]
|
14360
|
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives?
[Jackson]
|
14359
|
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions
[Jackson]
|
14357
|
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false
[Jackson]
|
14356
|
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance
[Jackson]
|
13858
|
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable
[Jackson, by Edgington]
|
7880
|
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different
[Papineau on Jackson]
|
7378
|
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information
[Dennett on Jackson]
|
7377
|
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something
[Jackson]
|
4894
|
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way
[Perry on Jackson]
|
4895
|
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be
[Perry on Jackson]
|
4886
|
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge
[Jackson]
|
6976
|
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
[Jackson]
|
6975
|
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
[Jackson]
|
7005
|
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account
[Jackson]
|
6979
|
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences
[Jackson]
|
6977
|
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
[Jackson]
|
6980
|
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
[Jackson]
|
6982
|
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible
[Jackson]
|
6991
|
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect
[Jackson]
|
6990
|
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water'
[Jackson]
|
6985
|
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases
[Jackson]
|
6989
|
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
[Jackson]
|
6983
|
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
[Jackson]
|
6984
|
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
[Jackson]
|
6987
|
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
[Jackson]
|
6986
|
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
[Jackson]
|
6988
|
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
[Jackson]
|
6993
|
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
[Jackson]
|
6992
|
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
[Jackson]
|
6996
|
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output
[Jackson]
|
6994
|
Truth supervenes on being
[Jackson]
|
6998
|
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing
[Jackson]
|
6997
|
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality
[Jackson]
|
7000
|
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
[Jackson]
|
6999
|
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide
[Jackson]
|
6995
|
Successful predication supervenes on nature
[Jackson]
|
6978
|
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
[Jackson]
|
14707
|
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings
[Jackson, by Schroeter]
|
14632
|
Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem
[Jackson]
|
14631
|
How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false?
[Jackson]
|
14633
|
How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic?
[Jackson]
|
14635
|
An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears
[Jackson]
|