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Single Idea 14712
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
]
Full Idea
The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
Gist of Idea
A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false
Source
David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.24
A Reaction
[The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.
Related Ideas
Idea 14710
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
Idea 14704
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
The
57 ideas
from David J.Chalmers
16473
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Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths
[Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
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19258
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Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world
[Chalmers, by Vaidya]
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14708
|
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility
[Chalmers, by Schroeter]
|
9318
|
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation
[Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
|
2386
|
Hard Problem: why brains experience things
[Chalmers]
|
2389
|
Sometimes we don't notice our pains
[Chalmers]
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2390
|
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour
[Chalmers]
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2391
|
Can we be aware but not conscious?
[Chalmers]
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2392
|
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other
[Chalmers]
|
2393
|
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set
[Chalmers]
|
2394
|
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set
[Chalmers]
|
2395
|
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
|
2397
|
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state
[Chalmers]
|
2396
|
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation
[Chalmers]
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2398
|
Reduction requires logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
|
13960
|
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
[Chalmers]
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13956
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Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
[Chalmers]
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13963
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Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind
[Chalmers]
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement
[Chalmers]
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13958
|
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
[Chalmers]
|
2399
|
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
[Chalmers]
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
[Chalmers]
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
[Chalmers]
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
[Chalmers]
|
2400
|
Is intentionality just causal connections?
[Chalmers]
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2401
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All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me
[Chalmers]
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18403
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Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it
[Chalmers]
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16048
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Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same
[Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
|
2402
|
It seems possible to invert qualia
[Chalmers]
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2403
|
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness
[Chalmers]
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2404
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Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
[Chalmers]
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2405
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Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base
[Chalmers]
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2406
|
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
|
2407
|
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star)
[Chalmers]
|
16424
|
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
[Chalmers]
|
16425
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Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
[Chalmers]
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16426
|
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world
[Chalmers]
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16427
|
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible
[Chalmers]
|
2409
|
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level?
[Chalmers]
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2411
|
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible
[Chalmers]
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2413
|
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
[Chalmers]
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2412
|
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness?
[Chalmers]
|
2414
|
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences
[Chalmers]
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2415
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In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing
[Chalmers]
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2416
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What turns awareness into consciousness?
[Chalmers]
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2417
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Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation?
[Chalmers]
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
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2419
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Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement?
[Chalmers]
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2422
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The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it
[Chalmers]
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2423
|
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
[Chalmers]
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2424
|
It is odd if experience is a very recent development
[Chalmers]
|
2426
|
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained?
[Chalmers]
|
2428
|
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
[Chalmers]
|
2429
|
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
[Chalmers]
|
14712
|
A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false
[Chalmers]
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14713
|
Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent
[Chalmers]
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14739
|
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds
[Chalmers, by Sider]
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