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Single Idea 14732
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
]
Full Idea
The physical object, as inferred from perception, is a group of events arranged about a centre.
Gist of Idea
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Analysis of Matter' [Routledge 1992], p.244
A Reaction
At least I like the active aspect of this definition. You then have to explain what an event is, without mentioning objects. You'd better no mention properties either, since they will probably depend on the dreaded objects.
Related Idea
Idea 14733
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
The
37 ideas
with the same theme
[what distinctively unifies physical objects]:
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16154
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Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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16158
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Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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12499
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Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion
[Locke]
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5533
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Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
[Kant]
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21449
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The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience
[Kant]
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14732
|
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre
[Russell]
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6473
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Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws
[Russell]
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23466
|
Objects are the substance of the world
[Wittgenstein]
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8498
|
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
[Quine]
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9018
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A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time
[Quine]
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1628
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If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
[Quine]
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8464
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Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected
[Quine]
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7924
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The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science
[Quine]
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2351
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Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved
[Putnam]
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10541
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Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension
[Dummett]
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17556
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Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff
[Inwagen]
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8264
|
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables
[Inwagen, by Lowe]
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8515
|
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
[Campbell,K]
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8519
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Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
[Campbell,K]
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11116
|
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
[Jubien]
|
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7685
|
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
[Jacquette]
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7008
|
Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
[Heil]
|
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7018
|
Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
[Heil]
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10272
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The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical
[Shapiro]
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8267
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Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
[Lowe]
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8265
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Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
[Lowe]
|
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8275
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Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
[Lowe]
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16130
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To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
[Lowe]
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16232
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An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
[Hawley]
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6124
|
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
[Merricks]
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6134
|
Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
[Merricks]
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10782
|
The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic
[Linnebo]
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14952
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Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it)
[Ladyman/Ross]
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14485
|
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
[Thomasson]
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14487
|
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
[Thomasson]
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23772
|
If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers
[Williams,NE]
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22627
|
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them
[Ingthorsson]
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