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Single Idea 14734

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series ]

Full Idea

The B-series has two components: eternalism - the thesis that all future entities are real - and the thesis of reducibility of tense.

Gist of Idea

The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense

Source

Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 4.2)

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Four Dimensionalism' [OUP 2003], p.76


The 12 ideas with the same theme [B-series, of equal times, with no past-present-future]:

Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K]
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller]