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Single Idea 14737
[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
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Full Idea
The problem of 'temporary intrinsics' is that in one model we think of properties as relations to times (I am 'bent' relative to now), but change sometime involves intrinsic properties. I am just plain bent, not bent with respect to something else.
Gist of Idea
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic
Source
report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.202-4) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Four Dimensionalism' [OUP 2003], p.95
A Reaction
[I've compressed Sider's summary] The question of whether intrinsic properties endure over time runs in parallel with the question of whether objects endure over time, and the two issues cannot be separated.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[how identity fares when an object's properties change]:
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16159
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For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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16173
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Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration
[Aristotle]
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17042
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Natural things are their own source of stability through change
[Aristotle]
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16059
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Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity
[Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
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1330
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If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual
[Hume]
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1321
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If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it
[Hume]
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15220
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To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction
[Harré/Madden]
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15222
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Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity
[Harré/Madden]
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15296
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A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity
[Harré/Madden]
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14737
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Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Sider]
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3309
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If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow?
[Benardete,JA]
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6618
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A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
[Lowe]
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16193
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'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property
[Hawley]
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16195
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Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one
[Hawley]
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16202
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The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time
[Hawley]
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18930
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Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
[Cameron]
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23018
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How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time?
[Baron/Miller]
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