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Single Idea 14739

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics ]

Full Idea

For Chalmers, 'water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, in that it has different secondary intensions relative to different worlds of utterance.

Clarification

The 'intension' is what picks out the instances of water

Gist of Idea

'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds

Source

report of David J.Chalmers (Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics [2006]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 7.2

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Four Dimensionalism' [OUP 2003], p.108


A Reaction

In this way 'water' is regarded as being like an indexical (such as 'I'), which has a fixed meaning component, and a second component which varies with different utterances. Maybe.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning by possible worlds with two separate components]:

Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]