more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 14746

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

It would be incredible if what there is, rather than what we select for attention, depends on human activity and our conceptual scheme. One might expand to possible sortal concepts, rather than our language, but that amounts to four-dimensionalism.

Gist of Idea

What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal

Source

comment on David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.3

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Four Dimensionalism' [OUP 2003], p.156


A Reaction

[compression of a nice anti-Wiggins paragraph] He suggests that Wiggins is seeking an intermediate course (between narrow chauvinism about concepts, and excessive liberalism) in a discussion of natural kinds versus artifacts.


The 33 ideas with the same theme [what is the hallmark for deciding what exists?]:

To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato]
Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios]
Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
Existences can only be known by experience [Locke]
What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
The criterion of existence is the possibility of action [Santayana]
What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell]
To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou]
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]