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Single Idea 14760
[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
]
Full Idea
Four-dimensionalism does not respect a deep difference between thing-talk and process-talk, because it tends to place events and things in the same ontological category.
Gist of Idea
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category
Source
Theodore Sider (Four Dimensionalism [2001], 6.1)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Four Dimensionalism' [OUP 2003], p.211
A Reaction
He then quotes Broad, Idea 14759. This idea is the best reason yet for being sympathetic to the four-dimensionalist view, because I think processes really must have a central place in any decent ontology.
Related Idea
Idea 14759
A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
The
29 ideas
from 'Four Dimensionalism'
14752
|
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay
[Sider]
|
14721
|
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative
[Sider]
|
14722
|
Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not
[Sider]
|
14723
|
Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance
[Sider]
|
14725
|
Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time
[Sider]
|
14724
|
Presentists must deny truths about multiple times
[Sider]
|
14194
|
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones
[Sider]
|
14726
|
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time
[Sider]
|
14727
|
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts'
[Sider]
|
14728
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4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts
[Sider]
|
14729
|
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists
[Sider]
|
14730
|
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects
[Sider]
|
14731
|
Temporal parts are instantaneous
[Sider]
|
14734
|
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense
[Sider]
|
14735
|
Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation
[Sider]
|
14736
|
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present
[Sider]
|
14740
|
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one
[Sider]
|
14741
|
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger
[Sider]
|
14743
|
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities
[Sider]
|
14747
|
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it
[Sider]
|
14745
|
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are
[Sider]
|
14754
|
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity
[Sider]
|
14756
|
For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description
[Sider]
|
14757
|
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence
[Sider]
|
14758
|
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time?
[Sider]
|
14760
|
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category
[Sider]
|
14762
|
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts
[Sider]
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14763
|
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts
[Sider]
|
14738
|
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism
[Sider]
|