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Single Idea 14774
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
]
Full Idea
It seems to me there is the most historic proof that innate truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with error, and therefore a fortiori not without exception.
Clarification
'A fortiori' means 'even more obviously'
Gist of Idea
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.57
The
117 ideas
from Charles Sanders Peirce
14790
|
'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others
[Peirce]
|
14791
|
Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction
[Peirce]
|
14303
|
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false
[Peirce]
|
14799
|
Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them
[Peirce]
|
14800
|
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity
[Peirce]
|
14801
|
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results
[Peirce]
|
14802
|
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction
[Peirce]
|
14764
|
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science
[Peirce]
|
14767
|
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine
[Peirce]
|
14765
|
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age
[Peirce]
|
14766
|
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science
[Peirce]
|
14768
|
Infallibility in science is just a joke
[Peirce]
|
14798
|
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction
[Peirce]
|
14797
|
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought
[Peirce]
|
14803
|
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature
[Peirce]
|
14804
|
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs
[Peirce]
|
14805
|
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms?
[Peirce]
|
14806
|
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance
[Peirce]
|
14794
|
Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt
[Peirce]
|
14792
|
A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life
[Peirce]
|
14793
|
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications
[Peirce]
|
6598
|
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency
[Peirce]
|
21492
|
Realism is basic to the scientific method
[Peirce]
|
6937
|
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known
[Peirce]
|
6939
|
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)
[Peirce]
|
6938
|
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones
[Peirce]
|
6941
|
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
[Peirce]
|
6940
|
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
[Peirce]
|
6943
|
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
[Peirce]
|
6942
|
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
[Peirce]
|
6944
|
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
|
6945
|
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
[Peirce]
|
6946
|
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment
[Peirce]
|
6947
|
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe
[Peirce]
|
6948
|
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
|
6949
|
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction
[Peirce]
|
19087
|
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to
[Peirce]
|
14781
|
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed
[Peirce]
|
7634
|
Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional
[Peirce, by Maund]
|
14906
|
Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable
[Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
|
19089
|
Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences
[Peirce]
|
7660
|
We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits
[Peirce]
|
7661
|
Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
[Peirce]
|
14789
|
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience
[Peirce]
|
14782
|
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience
[Peirce]
|
14783
|
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means
[Peirce]
|
14784
|
Ethics is the science of aims
[Peirce]
|
14785
|
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas
[Peirce]
|
14787
|
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction
[Peirce]
|
14786
|
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions
[Peirce]
|
14788
|
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract
[Peirce]
|
15335
|
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?
[Horsten on Peirce]
|
14795
|
Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths
[Peirce]
|
14796
|
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry
[Peirce]
|
19231
|
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics
[Peirce]
|
19229
|
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types
[Peirce]
|
19219
|
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard
[Peirce]
|
19228
|
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence
[Peirce]
|
19227
|
Philosophy is a search for real truth
[Peirce]
|
19218
|
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic
[Peirce]
|
19226
|
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts
[Peirce]
|
19223
|
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
[Peirce]
|
19224
|
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it
[Peirce]
|
19222
|
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons
[Peirce]
|
19220
|
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes!
[Peirce]
|
19225
|
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below
[Peirce]
|
19221
|
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial
[Peirce]
|
19230
|
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power
[Peirce]
|
19233
|
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around
[Peirce]
|
19234
|
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general
[Peirce]
|
19236
|
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions
[Peirce]
|
19235
|
How does induction get started?
[Peirce]
|
19232
|
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true
[Peirce]
|
19240
|
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning
[Peirce]
|
19239
|
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything
[Peirce]
|
19241
|
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems
[Peirce]
|
19237
|
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true
[Peirce]
|
19238
|
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes)
[Peirce]
|
19242
|
Generalization is the true end of life
[Peirce]
|
19243
|
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble
[Peirce]
|
19245
|
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study
[Peirce]
|
19244
|
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless
[Peirce]
|
19246
|
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
[Peirce]
|
19247
|
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth
[Peirce]
|
19250
|
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged
[Peirce]
|
19249
|
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you
[Peirce]
|
19248
|
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation
[Peirce]
|
19251
|
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample
[Peirce]
|
19252
|
Objective chance is the property of a distribution
[Peirce]
|
19253
|
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance
[Peirce]
|
19255
|
Generalisation is the great law of mind
[Peirce]
|
19254
|
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution
[Peirce]
|
19257
|
Whatever is First must be sentient
[Peirce]
|
19256
|
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing
[Peirce]
|
14769
|
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way
[Peirce]
|
14772
|
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right
[Peirce]
|
14773
|
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration
[Peirce]
|
14771
|
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired
[Peirce]
|
14775
|
Numbers are just names devised for counting
[Peirce]
|
14776
|
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact
[Peirce]
|
14770
|
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision
[Peirce]
|
14774
|
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions
[Peirce]
|
14778
|
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them
[Peirce]
|
14777
|
That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things
[Peirce]
|
14779
|
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise
[Peirce]
|
14780
|
Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient
[Peirce]
|
19095
|
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
[Peirce, by Misak]
|
19097
|
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful
[Peirce, by Misak]
|
21494
|
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely?
[Atkin on Peirce]
|
21489
|
Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases
[Peirce, by Atkin]
|
19102
|
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic
[Peirce, by Misak]
|
21491
|
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism
[Peirce, by Atkin]
|
10352
|
The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down
[Peirce]
|
16376
|
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular
[Peirce]
|
13498
|
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations
[Peirce, by Hart,WD]
|
19107
|
Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog
[Peirce]
|
21493
|
Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter
[Peirce]
|