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Single Idea 14776

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism ]

Full Idea

To say that 'if' there are two persons and each person has two eyes there 'will be' four eyes is not a statement of fact, but a statement about the system of numbers which is our own creation.

Gist of Idea

That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism [1899], II)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.59


A Reaction

One eye for each arm of the people is certainly a fact. Frege uses this equivalence to build numbers. I think Peirce is wrong. If it is not a fact that these people have four eyes, I don't know what 'four' means. It's being two pairs is also a fact.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [denials that mathematics is rooted in experience]:

The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege]
The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]