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Single Idea 14777

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth ]

Full Idea

Either J and the judgment 'I say that J is true' are the same for all judgments or for none. But if identical, their denials are identical. These are 'J is not true' and 'I do not say that J is true', which are different. No judgment judges itself true.

Gist of Idea

That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.121


A Reaction

If you are going to espouse the Ramseyan redundancy view of truth, you had better make sure you are not guilty of the error which Peirce identifies here.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [truth is an unnecessary meaningless concept]:

That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell]
"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein]
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]