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Full Idea
If one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it.
Gist of Idea
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.252
A Reaction
Strictly, I would have thought you could only affirm or deny a complete proposition, rather than a concept. What should I do with the concept of a 'unicorn'? Note that all theories, such as empiricism or pragmatism, begin with an account of our concepts.
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
| 21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
| 18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |