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Single Idea 14796
[filed under theme 3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
]
Full Idea
I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any 'truth') to its being the predestined result to which sufficient enquiry would ultimately lead.
Gist of Idea
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.288)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.288
Related Ideas
Idea 14968
A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
Idea 16295
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[truth as the aim of enquiry]:
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19571
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Delusion and truth differ in their life functions
[Novalis]
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7661
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Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
[Peirce]
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15335
|
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?
[Horsten on Peirce]
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14796
|
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry
[Peirce]
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19246
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'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
[Peirce]
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19095
|
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
[Peirce, by Misak]
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19097
|
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful
[Peirce, by Misak]
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21494
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If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely?
[Atkin on Peirce]
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22305
|
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true
[James]
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18984
|
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise)
[James]
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7616
|
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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8828
|
Truth is rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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2549
|
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
[Rorty]
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22665
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Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature
[Nozick]
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3884
|
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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6627
|
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth
[Stich, by Lowe]
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19086
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Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible?
[Macbeth]
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15336
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The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B
[Horsten]
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19094
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For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible
[Misak]
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19100
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Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling
[Misak]
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19099
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'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence...
[Misak]
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19103
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'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it
[Misak]
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19105
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Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
[Misak]
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19108
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Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards
[Misak]
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