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Single Idea 14806

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory ]

Full Idea

The mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to baldly attribute it to chance.

Gist of Idea

If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.337)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.337


A Reaction

If now complete is even remotely available, then that doesn't seem to matter too much, but if there is one message modern physics teaches philosophy, it is that we should not give up on trying to answer the deeper questions.


The 41 ideas with the same theme [laws are merely patterns in physical events]:

I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos]
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche]
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman]
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis]
We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin]
Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird]
There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird]
A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird]
If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird]
Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird]
Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird]
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird]
There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird]
If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird]
Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird]
Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]