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Single Idea 14893
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
]
Full Idea
Kripke's proposal that referential expressions like indexicals, demonstratives, proper names and natural kind terms are de jure rigid designators created a puzzle - it entails 'modal illusions', truths that are in fact necessary appear to be contingent.
Clarification
'de jure' means 'by law' (rather than 'in practice')
Gist of Idea
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent?
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], p.143-4) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1
Book Ref
'Two-Dimensional Semantics', ed/tr. Garcia-Carpentero/Macia [OUP 2006], p.1
A Reaction
They are identifying this puzzle as the source of the need for two-dimensional semantics. Kripke notes that rigid designators may have their reference fixed by non-rigid descriptions.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[giving meaning by possible worlds with two separate components]:
14893
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Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent?
[Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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14894
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Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context)
[Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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14700
|
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context
[Kaplan, by Schroeter]
|
16430
|
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
[Stalnaker]
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16431
|
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content
[Stalnaker]
|
13972
|
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity
[Soames]
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14708
|
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility
[Chalmers, by Schroeter]
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13958
|
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
[Chalmers]
|
2399
|
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
[Chalmers]
|
13959
|
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
[Chalmers]
|
13957
|
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
[Chalmers]
|
13961
|
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
[Chalmers]
|
14739
|
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds
[Chalmers, by Sider]
|
16351
|
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
[Recanati]
|
16350
|
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
[Recanati]
|
14701
|
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical
[Schroeter]
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14702
|
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this
[Schroeter]
|
14705
|
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori?
[Schroeter]
|
14715
|
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference
[Schroeter]
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14716
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2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved
[Schroeter]
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