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Single Idea 14893

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics ]

Full Idea

Kripke's proposal that referential expressions like indexicals, demonstratives, proper names and natural kind terms are de jure rigid designators created a puzzle - it entails 'modal illusions', truths that are in fact necessary appear to be contingent.

Clarification

'de jure' means 'by law' (rather than 'in practice')

Gist of Idea

Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent?

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], p.143-4) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1

Book Ref

'Two-Dimensional Semantics', ed/tr. Garcia-Carpentero/Macia [OUP 2006], p.1

A Reaction

They are identifying this puzzle as the source of the need for two-dimensional semantics. Kripke notes that rigid designators may have their reference fixed by non-rigid descriptions.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning by possible worlds with two separate components]:

14893 Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
14894 Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
14700 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
14708 Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
2399 Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
13957 Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
13961 We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
14739 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
16351 In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
16350 Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
14701 Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
14702 If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
14705 Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
14715 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
14716 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]