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Single Idea 14912
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
]
Full Idea
The metaphysician has no test for the truth of her beliefs except that other metaphysicians can't think of obviously superior alternative beliefs. (They can always think of possibly superior ones, in profusion).
Gist of Idea
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories
Source
J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 1.7)
Book Ref
Ladyman,J/Ross,D: 'Every Thing Must Go' [OUP 2007], p.58
A Reaction
[they cite Van Fraassen for this view] At least this seems to concede that some metaphysical views can be rejected by the observation of beliefs that are superior. Almost everyone has rejected Lewis on possible worlds for this reason.
The
60 ideas
from 'Every Thing Must Go'
14892
|
The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14891
|
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14897
|
We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14898
|
Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14899
|
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think?
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14902
|
Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14901
|
Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14903
|
Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14900
|
In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14904
|
Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14907
|
Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14908
|
Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14905
|
The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14909
|
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical)
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14910
|
Some science is so general that it is metaphysical
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14911
|
Science is opposed to downward causation
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14912
|
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14913
|
We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14914
|
Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14916
|
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14915
|
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14918
|
The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14920
|
If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14922
|
The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14921
|
The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14923
|
In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14924
|
If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance?
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14928
|
Things are abstractions from structures
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14927
|
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14925
|
The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14926
|
Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14929
|
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14931
|
That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14930
|
Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14932
|
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
10493
|
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14934
|
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14939
|
Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14936
|
A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14940
|
Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14937
|
That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14938
|
A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14942
|
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14941
|
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14943
|
Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14944
|
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14945
|
The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14946
|
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14947
|
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14948
|
To be is to be a real pattern
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14949
|
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14951
|
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14953
|
Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14954
|
Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14952
|
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it)
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14950
|
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14955
|
Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14958
|
A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14956
|
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14957
|
There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature
[Ladyman/Ross]
|