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Single Idea 14916

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction ]

Full Idea

We suggest a modal account of novel prediction. That a theory could predict some unknown phenomenon is what matters, not whether it actually did so predict.

Gist of Idea

What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so

Source

J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 2.1.3)

Book Ref

Ladyman,J/Ross,D: 'Every Thing Must Go' [OUP 2007], p.79


A Reaction

They also emphasise predicting new types of thing, rather than particular items. Some theories are powerful on explanation, but not so concerned with prediction. See Idea 14915.

Related Idea

Idea 14915 The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [predicting events as support for a theory]:

Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]