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Single Idea 14964
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
]
Full Idea
There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'!
Gist of Idea
The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences
Source
Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.90
A Reaction
Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems.
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[problem when liars refer to themselves]:
6006
|
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying
[Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
|
9464
|
One of their own prophets said that Cretans are always liars
[Anon (Titus)]
|
21564
|
Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL
[Russell]
|
21567
|
'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type
[Russell]
|
19187
|
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously
[Tarski]
|
8940
|
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language
[Tarski, by Fisher]
|
6569
|
'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition
[Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
|
21692
|
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox
[Quine]
|
14964
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The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences
[Gupta]
|
14969
|
Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true
[Gupta]
|
13507
|
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar
[Hart,WD]
|
9138
|
An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference
[Yablo, by Sorensen]
|
15428
|
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut'
[Burgess]
|
13371
|
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth
[Priest,G]
|
13372
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There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar
[Priest,G]
|
11014
|
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved
[Read]
|
9137
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Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English'
[Sorensen]
|
15355
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Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated
[Horsten]
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16336
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The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally)
[Halbach]
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