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Full Idea
There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'!
Gist of Idea
The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences
Source
Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.90
A Reaction
Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems.
14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |