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Single Idea 14964

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox ]

Full Idea

There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'!

Gist of Idea

The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences

Source

Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)

Book Ref

'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.90

A Reaction

Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems.

The 4 ideas from 'Truth'

14965 Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta]
14964 The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta]
14968 A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
14969 Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta]