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Single Idea 14964
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
]
Full Idea
There is the idea that the Liar paradox is solved simply by noting that truth is a property of propositions (not of sentences), and the Liar sentence does not express a proposition. But we then say 'I am not now expressing a true proposition'!
Gist of Idea
The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences
Source
Anil Gupta (Truth [2001], 5.1)
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.90
A Reaction
Disappointed to learn this, since I think focusing on propositions (which are unambiguous) rather than sentences solves a huge number of philosophical problems.
The
16 ideas
from Anil Gupta
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11215
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Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski)
[Gupta]
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11216
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If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity
[Gupta]
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11217
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Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage
[Gupta]
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11220
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Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable
[Gupta]
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11218
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Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings
[Gupta]
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11221
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A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate
[Gupta]
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11222
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The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning
[Gupta]
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11223
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Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens'
[Gupta]
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11224
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Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive
[Gupta]
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11226
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Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability
[Gupta]
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11225
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A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds
[Gupta]
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11227
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The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output
[Gupta]
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14965
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Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true)
[Gupta]
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14964
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The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences
[Gupta]
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14968
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A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate
[Gupta]
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14969
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Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true
[Gupta]
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