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Full Idea
Kripke established that, contrary to the prevalent Tarskian dogma, attributions of truth do not always force a move to a metalanguage.
Gist of Idea
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975], 5.1) by Anil Gupta - Truth
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.93
A Reaction
[Gupta also cites Martin and Woodruff 1975]
16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |