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Single Idea 14978
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
]
Full Idea
Chisholm and Kim proposed a modal notion of an 'intrinsic' property - that a property is intrinsic if and only if it is possibly instantiated by an object that is alone in the world.
Gist of Idea
A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it
Source
Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 01.2)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.4
A Reaction
[He cites Chisholm 1976:127 and Kim 1982:59-60] Sider then gives a counterexample from David Lewis (Idea 14979).
Related Idea
Idea 14979
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
The
49 ideas
from 'Writing the Book of the World'
14977
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Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality
[Sider]
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14978
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A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it
[Sider]
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14980
|
There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic
[Sider]
|
14981
|
Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions
[Sider]
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14982
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If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss
[Sider]
|
14983
|
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints
[Sider]
|
14984
|
Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap?
[Sider]
|
14985
|
The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories
[Sider]
|
14986
|
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones
[Sider]
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14987
|
Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws'
[Sider]
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14988
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A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true
[Sider]
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14989
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Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature
[Sider]
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14990
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Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre
[Sider]
|
14991
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Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts)
[Sider]
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14992
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We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms
[Sider]
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14994
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Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables
[Sider]
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14995
|
Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation
[Sider]
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14997
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Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things
[Sider]
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14999
|
Prior to conventions, not all green things were green?
[Sider]
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14998
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Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation
[Sider]
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15000
|
'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p'
[Sider]
|
15001
|
'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted
[Sider]
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15004
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'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts
[Sider]
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15005
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Explanations must cite generalisations
[Sider]
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15003
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It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe
[Sider]
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15008
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Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)?
[Sider]
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15009
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We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs.
[Sider]
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15010
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Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept
[Sider]
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15012
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Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation
[Sider]
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15011
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If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited
[Sider]
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15013
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Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures
[Sider]
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15017
|
Supervenience is a modal connection
[Sider]
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15014
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Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism
[Sider]
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15016
|
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention
[Sider]
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15015
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It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact'
[Sider]
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15019
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Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral
[Sider]
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15020
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Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language
[Sider]
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15021
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The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space?
[Sider]
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15023
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The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered
[Sider]
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15024
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The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it
[Sider]
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15025
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The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are
[Sider]
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15027
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If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent
[Sider]
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15028
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Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori
[Sider]
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15026
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Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics
[Sider]
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15033
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Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works
[Sider]
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15030
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Humeans say that we decide what is necessary
[Sider]
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15029
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Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words
[Sider]
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15031
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Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language
[Sider]
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15018
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Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics
[Sider]
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